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1. Introduction
Generally speaking, the government plays an important role in not only
providing public goods and redistributing income, but stabilizing the economy
in a non-inflationary environment. In order to execute the fiscal activities of the
government sector, government expenditures, tax revenues and public debt are
essentially employed as the main economic instruments. Apart from a balanced
budget state, the budget frequently generates fiscal surpluses and deficits as a
result of an expenditure-revenue gap, depending on the general level of eco-
nomic expansion or contraction. Thus, fiscal deficits (or surpluses) provide us
with a certain yardstick to express the basic nature of government fiscal activity.
It is noteworthy that large fiscal deficits have long persisted in most ad-
vanced countries, which in turn remain one of the most important problems to
be solved in the years ahead. Many countries have begun to recognize the risks
that continuing fiscal deficits entail in terms of exploding into an unsustainable
debt accumulation, particularly in an environment of lower growth rates and
high interest rates. In fact, a significant number of OECD countries have estab-
lished fiscal targets in recent years to attain balanced or modest deficit positions
in the general government account, as will be argued later.
Japan's fiscal position has sharply worsened since the early 1990s in terms
of fiscal deficits and debt accumulation, reflecting the sluggishness of the eco-
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nomic recovery since the post-bubble recession. In Japan, great care has offi-
ciallybeen taken to restrainfiscaldeficitsfrom expanding by the fiscalauthor-
ity, the MOF (Ministry of Finance),while Keynesian fiscalpolicies stillremain
predominant as an expansionary device. As a consequence, the centralquestion
addressed in this paper is how fiscalpolicy issues have been handled among all
the partiesconcerned in relationto the expansion of fiscaldeficitsin the past.
This paper is divided into four parts. First,we consider brieflythe recent
development of Japan's fiscaldeficitsin comparison with those of other major
countries. Second, we attemt to clarifythe traditionalbudgetary rule adopted
by the MOF in contrastto the Keynesian view. Third, we note the strategiesof
deficitreduction in the annual process of budgeting. Lastly, we investigate the
effects of the bubble boom and its collapse on the budgetary behaviors. These
considerations would be of great help to understanding the underlying condi-
tions of Japan's fiscalpolicy.
2. Recent Trends of Fiscal Deficits in International Perspectives
2.1 Current State of Fiscal Positions in Major Countries
In Europe, the US and Japan, increasing importance has begun to be
placed on the current level of fiscal deficitsand accumulated debt in recent
years. Policy makers tend not only to address policy management issues related
to the immediate economic situation,but also to meet important medium-term
policy goals to restore the annual balance of budgets. It is generally acknowl-
edged that a stable fiscalenvironment would be essential to enhance the flexi-
bility of the economy. For this purpose, well-designed macroeconomic and
structuralpoliciesare requested to reduce fiscaldeficitsin major countries.
Among many OECD countries,the deficit-reductionprogrammes have al-
ready assistedin lowering real interestrates and easing the pressures on cur-
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rency markets through the enhancement of the nation's credibility. Also, fur-
ther beneficial effects are expected in the coming years through such an effort.
However, in spite of fiscal consolidation efforts,large fiscal deficits and the ris-
ing public debt outstanding stillremain serious problems in each country.
Figure 1 is prepared to indicate the past trends of fiscal deficits in the G7
countries for the period 1979-1997 along with furure projections. In order to
obtain an adequate measurement common to each country, the relative ratio of
fiscal deficits to GDP is employed in accordance with the SNA concept. There
are a couple of points unique to Japan. First of all, Japan had successfully
eliminated in the 1980s the large fiscal deficits which occurred in the late 1970s,
and then turned them into a surplus after the mid-1980s. As will be argued
shortly, this restoration of fiscal soundness was mainly caused by massive tax
increases during the bubble boom.
Second, however, the fiscal deficit-GDP ratio had begun to rise again after
the early 1990s. This recent trend in Japan ought to be sharply contrasted to
those of other major countries, because all of them except for Japan have been
able to decrease the relative size of their fiscal deficits to a considerable extent
for several years. Thus, it is noted that Japan's fiscal deficit surpassed in 1996
those of the five other countries with the exception of Italy, reaching the worst
situation among the G5 countries.
As described earlier, the general government is composed of three compo-
nents: central government, the local government, and the social security fund.
Inspecting each component in detail, it can be noted that the social security
fund in Japan still accumulates a substantial surplus even now, unlike that of
other major countries except for the US. However, such fund surpluses are an-
ticipated to disappear for some time to come as the population is aging, given
that the current scheme is on a pay-as-you-go basis. Thus it might be better to
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eliminate the ongoing accumulated surplus in the social security fund from the
definition of fiscal deficits in the general government of both Japan and the US.
If we use such a revised deficit-GDP ratio, Japan's fiscal position becomes
much more aggravated: 7.0 percent (3.5 percent) in 1994, 7.4 percent (3.9 percent)
in 1995, 8.2 percent (4.8 percent) in 1996 and 7.5 percent (4.1 percent) in 1997.
The percentages in parentheses are those including the surplus of the social se-
curity fund. This being the case, Japan's fiscal deficits could exceed even the
Italian level in 1996 and 1997 (6.0 and 5.4 percent respectively).
Turning to another measurement, we shall now pay attention to the accu-
mulated debt-GDP ratios depicted in Figure 2. Current fiscal deficits continue
to increase the gross debt outstanding on a stock basis over time. Once fiscal
deficits are generated in the budgetary process, public indebtedness must accu-
mulate over a stretch of time.
The debt-GDP ratio started increasing at a faster speed than that of other
major countries except for Italy since the late 1970s. It slowed down once dur-
ing the period of 1987-91, reflecting the effects of deficit reduction on a flow
basis for the same period, but thereafter it turned upward again until the present.
That is to say, it is projected to be 90.1 percent in 1996 and 97.3 percent in
1997, approaching 100 percent, as Japan may catch up with Italy in the future if
the situation progresses as it is.
In retrospect, when have the fiscal deficit problems become evident in the
major countries? Since the two oil crises in 1973 and 1979, the growth rate of
the Japanese economy slowed down, and as a result, the nation's fiscal deficits
expanded at a rapid pace. This story was, however, not at all unique to Japan,
as many other countries of the world were plagued with similar problems.
Let us pay attention to the outstanding debts of central government as a
percentage of GDP since 1972 in 13 industrial countries. The ratio in Japan
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started to surge in 1974, immediately after the firstoil crisis in 1973. In 1974,
the simple average of the rates among the G7 countries remained at 22% while
Japan's debts as a percentage of GDP in 1974 were merely 9.7%, the second
lowest next to 7% for West Germany. However, the average ratio among the G
7 countries had soared to 45% by 1983, and the rate of increase in Japan was
the fastest,increasing from 8.7% to 44.7%, reaching the second highest propor-
tion after Italy's 78.6%.
A similar phenomenon can be observed in the smaller industrial countries
of Europe. The national debts have mushroomed during the decade of the 1970s
in almost all Western free economies. This situation may be called a "public
debt explosion" (see, de Larosiere, 1984).
2.2 Japan's Fiscal Position
The "explosion" in Japan is particularly conspicuous. Naturally, the public
debt issue has made it even more difficult for the government to compile the
budget every year. Table 1 represents the bond dependency ratio (ratio of na-
tional bond issues to totalgovernment expenditures) in the general account of the na-
tional government in order to observe the past patterns of fiscal deficits in the
narrowest scope since 1965. Japan has traditionally placed the highest priority
on this ratio among relevant indicators in measuring the soundness of fiscal per-
formance or fiscal discipline, although this is not common to overseas countries.
The bond dependency ratio originated in 1965 where the first debt-covering
bonds were obliged to be floated to make up for the shortage of tax revenues in
the supplementary budget of that year. Thus, the balanced budget position
adopted by the MOF ended when the Japanese economy was faced with a de-
pression and the MOF admitted to the necessity of stimulating the economy by
generating fiscal deficits. However, after national bonds were issued on a sub-
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stantialscale in 1966, the government made a strenuous effort to curtailthem
each year until the early 1970s, at least placing no reliance on debt-covering
bonds.
Table 1 Trends of FiscalDeficitsin Japan:Bond Dependency Ratio for1965-96
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The explosion of fiscal deficits in the general account of the national
budget became serious after 1975. The harsh prolonged recession triggered by
the oil shock produced an exhorbitant deficit in the government sector, and the
revenue shortage became evident during the implementation of the 1975 budget.
Thus, a sharp increase in national bond flotation was necessary in the supple-
mentary budget of 1975. The initial budget of 1975 planned to issue only
＼2,000 billion worth of bonds, but ＼3,400 billion more were added to the origi-
nal plan as the large revenue shortage caused by the recession became more
evident. Thus, debt-covering bonds had to be issued once again starting in fis-
cal 1975. In addition to the national government, local governments have also
fallen into financial crises making it imperative for them to float local bonds in
large amounts.
The bond dependency ratio reached 25.3 percent after supplementation in
1975, and this ratio rose to 29.4% in the 1976 budget. Furthermore, it contin-
ued to increase to reach a peak of 34.7 percent in 1979. These dependency ra-
tios are surprisingly high, compared with the 10.4 percent average of 1965-74.
After reaching a peak in 1979, the bond dependency ratio began a constant de-
cline until 1986, mainly due to expenditure cuts. Thereafter, a further decreas-
ing tempo in fiscal deficits can be observed during the period of 1986-1990. In
particular, during this period, the bubble boom was spread widely to the econ-
omy as a whole, and contributed a lot to the generation of vast tax increases
and to higher rates of nominal GDP. As will be argued below, such windfall
type of tax increases greatly assisted in reducing fiscal deficits,leading to a suc-
cessful achievement of the target of fiscal consolidation no issuance of deficit-
covering bonds. However, once again, the bond dependency ratio began to rise
sharply after 1991, mainly reflecting the stagnant state of the post-bubble reces-
sion.
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Fiscal consolidation (in more fashionableterms, fiscalreconstruction)became
increasingly important as a major policy target since the mid-1970s. The first
objective of eliminating the issuance of debt-covering bonds as a slogan of fis-
cal consolidation was achieved in fiscal1989 with a lot of budgetary maneuvers,
mainly due to a massive amount of unintended increases in revenues from the
bubble boom. After the collapse of the bubble, however, the fiscaldeficitprob-
lem has grown worse once again, as mentioned repeatedly. The bond depend-
ency ration began to rise up, reaching 28 percent in fiscal1996, the same level
as in fiscal1980.
As evident from the major fact findings described above, Japan's fiscal
deficitposes a serious problems today. For example, a recent OECD report
statesthe following:
"Once an economic recovery is under way, Japan's fiscal position will
have to be greatly strengthened in order to arrestand reverse the rise of public
debt to GDP. This requirement is particularlyurgent in view of the expenditure
pressures that will soon appear due to the ageing of the population" (OECD,
1995, p. xii).
This statement is certainly true. Japan's policy makers should follow this
policy recommendation, although itis very difficultfor them to determine when
deficit-reductionmeasures can be embarked upon, given the weaker signs of
economic recovery. No doubt, concerns that fiscalretrenchment may have a
negative impact on economic activityand employment frequentlylead them to
act prudently. In addition, apart from such a difficultjudgment, they will have
to make politicallyhard decisions to restore a sound fiscalposition because of
unpopular policy such as expenditure cuts, tax increases or both. In Japan,
however, the policy of aiming for a balance in the fiscalposition will be an ab-
solute requirement once the signs of economic recovery solidlyappear.
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One of the chief reasons behind the necessity for fiscal consolidation re-
flects the fact that the current situation of Japan's deficits has already deterio-
rated to a greater extent than that of other major countries, as stressed earlier.
As a matter of fact, it would be almost impossible for Japan to satisfy the
Maastricht criteriaif it were a relevant target. In Europe, members of the Euro-
pean Union have made political decisions regarding two reference criteria, to
keep fiscal deficits in line with a 3 percent or less for deficit-to-GDP ratio and
a 60 percent or less debt outstanding-to-GDP ratio. Any European country that
wishes to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 will have to meet
these Maastricht criteria. Thus, the Maastricht criteria are regarded as interna-
tional standards of restricting fiscal deficits, but unfortunately the current situ-
ation of Japan's fiscal position is far from achieving such a standard.
Now each country in Europe is making assiduous efforts toward fiscal con-
solidation. The pace at which stronger fiscal positions could be established
may vary from one country to another, and additional fiscal actions are clearly
needed to implement concrete criteria. It is, however, generally believed that
early, decisive fiscal actions have improved credibility, decreasing risk premia
on interest rates and reducing the cost of debt servicing.
Japan has so far been the major exception in making progress to reduce
fiscal deficits mainly for two reasons. For one thing, a hesitant recovery after
the bottoming out of the post-bubble recession has repeatedly required addi-
tional expansionary packages. The other is that Keynesian fiscal policy stillaf-
fects dominantly the policy-making process. No doubt, these have contributed to
a deterioration of Japan's fiscal balance as described above.
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3. The Balanced Budget Principle and Its Aftermath
3.1 Budget Orthodoxy and Fiscal Performance
It is very important to analyze how the fiscal authority has behaved to
manage fiscal policy and control the level of fiscal deficits in view of govern-
ment fiscal activity. On this point, great emphasis has been consistently placed
on the balanced budget rule by the MOF from a standpoint of budget orthodoxy.
In the following discussion, let us focus on the definition of fiscal deficits
in the general account of the national government budget, because fiscal behav-
ior can be expressed very well in this scope of the budget. Prior to 1965, as
seen in Table 1, no fiscal deficits had been incurred in the operation of fiscal
policies. The MOF had strictly maintained a balanced budget policy.
The MOF's budgetary orthodoxy prior to 1965 seems to have been based
upon the following three empirical rules (see,Ishi 1973):
(1) a balanced budget
(2) a tax policy with a constant ratio of tax burden relative to national income
(3) an intended underestimation of the "natural increase in tax revenues"
caused by a growing economy
The firstrule, the balanced budget, has been the dominant characteristic of
fiscal policy in postwar Japan accompanied by the additional two rules. The ba-
sis for this lies in the traditional view of "sound" finance, that is, all current ex-
penditures must be financed by current revenues in the government sector. Fol-
lowing this axiom, the issuing of national bonds during the postwar period was
restricted rigidly by a statutory limit to "construction bonds" by the Finance
Law to prevent the easy use of deficit-covering bonds. This concern for a bal-
anced budget had been the result of the extravagant government spending and
the inflationary pressures which had been experienced in prewar Japan. At the
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outset of the Dodge Plan," the balanced budget was actuallyimplemented at all
levels of the government, that is, not only in the general account of national
government but also in its special accounts, in other accounts of government-
affiliatedagencies, and in local governments.
However, the balanced budget policy had to be altered with the passage of
time. Indeed, government guaranteed bonds in the FiscalInvestment and Loan
Programme (FILP) and local government bonds began to be issued gradually. It
was not until 1965 that national bonds were issued and a deficitappeared in the
general account. Not even "construction bonds" were issued prior to this date.
Thus, we should note that the meaning of the term "balanced budget" has been
slightlychanged as the postwar period progressed. Nevertheless, it cannot be
denied that the balanced budget should be emphasized as the most fundamental
rule of government fiscalpolicy. Even afterthe budget became unbalanced af-
ter 1965, the MOF has constantly stuck to its desirable goal of restoring a bal-
anced budget.
The second empirical rule has been to keep the ratio of tax yields to na-
tional income constant (i.e.,20 percent). This rule for tax policy had been
adopted, especiallyin the period 1955-1965. In a growing economy like that of
postwar Japan, this rule leads to a large amount of tax reductions. In particular,
individual and corporate income taxes must be significantlyreduced every year.
Had tax reductions not been implemented, income taxation would have consid-
erably overburdened the taxpayers. Therefore, to avoid the overburdening of
taxpayers,income taxes had to be reduced successively almost every year (see,
Ishi 1993, ch. 3).
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In addition to these two rules, the intended underestimation of the natural
increase in tax revenues must be referred to as the third empirical rule. It bears
close relation to the two rules discussed above. Some tax revenues, such as
that from the individual income tax, naturally registerincreases as the tax base
expands with the growth of the economy even if there are no changes in the tax
rate and exemptions. The higher the rate of economic growth, the larger the
amount of natural increase in tax revenue that can be expected. In actuality,a
large volume of natural tax increases was realized each fiscalyear up to 1965
which provided a substantial amount of new financialresources in the prepara-
tion of the annual budget. That is to say, a portion of the natural tax increases
was appropriated to the financing of tax reductions, and another was devoted to
the financing of new expenditure programmes. Thus a big, expansion-minded
budget was actually created by means of such a large natural increase in tax
revenues, without creating the problem of fiscaldeficits.
A question can be raised about the estimation of the natural tax increases.
It is largely based on the anticipatedrate of economic growth which is usually
computed five or six months earlierthan the beginning of fiscalyear. For an
illustration,let us suppose that the GDP will expand 12 percent in the next year.
Based upon this anticipated rate, the MOF usually estimates what the natural
tax increases will be; for instance, more than 500 billion yen. In doing so,
some non-economic factorsmay be easilyintroduced into the calculationto bias
the anticipatedrate of economic growth. In most cases, an intentional underes-
timation of the GNP growth rate was proposed in order to decrease the ex-
pected amount of the natural tax increase used as a financial resource at this
stage of budgetary preparations.Thus, since at the end of each fiscalyear, the
realized rate of growth was always much higher than the anticipatedrate,(see,
Figure 3),an enormous naturalincrease in tax revenues materialized during the
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intermediate term aftertheimplementation of a new budget.
To sum up, the MOF's balanced budget policy played a dominant role in
fiscalactivitiesprior to 1965. The most important reason for this was that a
rapid growth in GDP had continued to provide constantly enough increasing tax
revenues enough to keep the general account of the national budget balanced.
As a consequence, the MOF did not need to issue national bonds and was suc-
cessfully able to sustainbudgetary orthodoxy.
The explosion phenomenon of Japan's fiscaldeficitsaccelerated since the
late 1970s, as evident from Table 1. When the government was compiling the
national budget plan for fiscal1977, there appeared to be a general consensus
urging the need to achieve an economic balance at the sacrificeof fiscalbalance.
At that time, in order to stimulate the depressed stateof the world economy, the
so-called "three engine countries" scheme was adopted by the Japanese govern-
ment as a result of its obligation to international policy coordination with the
US and W. Germany.
On the other hand, the MOF was endeavoring to return to a balanced
budget by stressing the importance of building the fiscalstructure on the basis
of sound fiscaloperations. This policy is not a Japanese monopoly, and the fis-
cal authoritiesof the US, the UK, Germany and France have been adopting a
similarstand. Why, then, are the fiscalauthoritiesadhering to the principle of a
balanced budget despite rising criticism?
The principle of a balanced budget is opposed to Keynesian fiscalpolicy in
the phase of policy management. Under Keynesian policy, the government is
called upon to manipulate the fiscalsurplus or deficitfor properly coping with
the domestic business boom or slump. From this standpoint, a policy stance of
the fiscalauthority that attaches top importance to the balance of fiscalactions
is considered excessively lukewarm. However, it also remains to be re-
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examined whether the policy prerequisite called fiscal policy could function
smoothly and efficiently in reality.
It is generally understood that the stabilizing effect of fiscal policy today is
theoretically self-evident. Nevertheless, it seems that it has not been suffi-
ciently utilized by fiscal authorities in any countries in actual policy perform-
ance. This is not because fiscal authorities have been ignorant of theories, but
because fiscal policy itself lacks adaptability to the real aspect of fiscal perform-
ance.
The Japan's MOF has persistently entertained misgivings about the practi-
cal adaptability of fiscal policy in the following three phases. First, fiscal ac-
tions may be utilized as a measure for stimulating business. However, it may
not be easily and effectively adopted reversely for tightening business. The fis-
cal tightening of business conditions inevitably invites the increase of taxes and
the decrease of government expenditures. Such an unpopular policy cannot be
adopted easily particularly when the political situation becomes extremely un-
stable.
Second, under the circumstances, an excessive fiscal deficit is feared to en-
sue. Some argue that a fiscal deficit caused by the program for stimulating
business can be erased with the natural increase in tax revenue in times of good
business. However, the timing and the size of such a natural increase are not
guaranteed.
Third, the departure from a balanced budget is liable to obstruct the func-
tion of resource allocation, the intrinsic function of fiscal operations. This prin-
cipal function of fiscal operations to allocate limited resources efficiently with-
out extravagance takes precedence over the economic stabilizing function, ex-
cept under extraordinary circumstances, such as an acute recession.
The principle of a balanced budget should not be unconditionally aban-
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doned as such adverse events take place, although it is stressed that the adjust-
ment of business conditions through fiscal operations is extremely important.2'
3.2 Main Causes of Expanding Fiscal Deficits
Fiscal deficits began to expand rapidly since the first oil shock in 1973,
and the situation worsened at the outbreak of the second oil crisis in 1979. The
MOF made a great effort in restricting the bond dependency ratio to below 30
percent in preparing the initial budget, but finally the effort failed. It is clear
that the MOF has been very reluctant to permit the pursuit of persistent deficit
financing, as evident from the past trend of fiscal deficits (see,Ishi 1986). At the
outset, national bonds were issued in accordance with the "construction bond
rule" which was strictly adhered to in each year before 1975. However, with
the massive amount of bond floatation described above, the government was
compelled to abandon this rule. Debt-covering bonds began to be issued on a
large scale in both the 1975 supplementary budget and the 1976 budget, as
noted above. In addition, the floatation of debt-covering bonds has continued
to expand as if they were a regular financial sources contrary to "the construc-
tion bond rule."
Then, what were the main causes of the sharp rise in fiscal deficits in the
past? Particular attention should be paid to two periods, 1975-79 and 1991-96,
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when the bond dependency ratio expanded tremendously. A number of factors
are considered to have been behind the rapid expansion of fiscaldeficitsin the
relevant periods, but the following two are of most importance among them.
First of all,great emphasis should be placed upon the strong requirement
of implementing fiscalexpansionary policiesto stimulate the conspicuous slow-
down of Japanese economic growth, caused by the two oil shocks in the late
1970s and the collapse of bubble in the early 1990s. Massive expansionary
measures in light of public investment have been triggered during the periods
under consideration,leaving vast fiscaldeficitsin its wake. Also, prolonged re-
cessions accompanied by lower growth rates tended to produce large revenue
shortages in the budget, which in turn accelerated the increasing tempo of fiscal
deficits(see,Ishi 1982).
As for the second factor explaining thelarge increases in fiscaldeficits,we
should take note of the expanded role that the Japanese government has played
with respect to income maintenance, free health care, education etc. This is
particularlyrelated to the firsthump in the dependency ratio which occurred in
the late 1970s. In the early 1970s, important institutionalreforms were com-
pleted in the social security system as apart of a slogan to construct a welfare
statein Japan. The target was to catch up with the Western level of social wel-
fare programmes through a public pension, medical care, etc. It was generally
pointed out that Japan had lagged behind Western countries in the development
of social welfare policies. Ironically,it was in 1973 that new social welfare
programmes were launched and they were expanded as largely as those in other
countries. Therefore, the year 1973 is often called "the firstyear for construct-
ing the welfare state"(see Noguchi 1983).
Although many new social programmes were builtin the system at that
time, it had been expected that the high rate of growth would continue in the
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future and would thus generate the additional resources needed to finance the
higher public expenditure. Unfortunately, in the decade that followed 1973, the
rate of growth fell considerably in Japan, as well as in most industrial countries.
Since 1973, in spite of reduced growth rates, the prevailing mood of the
time created high expectations on the role that the government should play be-
yond public sector activity. The frontier of what was considered as justifying
public sector intervention was progressively pushed outward. The greater sub-
sidization of public services, or even their free provision, made them cheap to
the users, thus increasing the demand for them. People came to feel that they
had almost a natural right to use cheap or free public services. In a democratic
society where election campaigns are constantly indispensable to be reelected,
the political process generally favored the expansion of public provision.
If the cost of the public provision had been totally covered by ordinary
revenues, there would have been no problem in providing increased public serv-
ices. However, while the electorate pushed for higher spending, it was far less
supportive of the tax increases that would have been needed to finance that
spending. To make matters worse, as noted below, tax revenues were substan-
tially reduced, reflecting the slowdown in economic growth. The gap between
government spending and revenue grew, contributing eventually to the higher
level of fiscal deficits.
It seems that these two factors to explain large increases in fiscal deficits
are more or less common among major industrial countries, including the US
and Japan. The question is how this problem should be solved in each country.
3.3 Fiscal Deficits Caused by Tax Shortages
In addition to the above two policy measures as explanatory factors of ex-
panded deficits, we must pay special attention to tax revenue shortages which
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automatically occurred during recessionary periods. Deficit financing is practi-
cally the only means available for dealing with revenue shortages. As a conse-
quence, it is necessary to examine the nature and causes of the tax shortages in
order to understand why deficits have been piling up since the debt explosion
started in the 1970s.
By definition, a tax shortage is a shortfall in the tax revenue at the end of
the year as compared with the amount of revenue forecast in the year's initial
budget. Figure 4 shows the tax shortages and surpluses that have been re-
corded since fiscal 1965. Fiscal deficits were virtually not important in the pe-
riod of rapid growth, which lasted until the early 1970s, so neither were tax
revenue shortages. The only two exceptions were fiscal 1965 when a deficit of
＼238 billion was recorded, and fiscal 1971 when the shortfall amounted to ＼365
billion. These occurrences were closely tied with recessions.
During the mid-1970s, however, tax shortages began to take on serious
proportions. The stagnation of the Japanese economy in fiscal 1975 following
the firstoil crisis resulted in a colossal shortfall of ＼3.6 trillion. Then the sec-
ond oil crisis plunged Japan into economic recession again, bringing about the
large revenue shortages of the early 1980s.
We can observe that huge tax surpluses have been incurred in the second
half of the 1980s during the bubble boom, and that the situation turned to the
reverse in the early 1990s as the bubble phenomenon burst. Evidently, tax reve-
nue surpluses and shortages have been closely related to the variation in fiscal
deficits, with a few exceptions.
Tax shortages have conventionally been attributed to a slowdown in the
growth rate of the Japanese economy, but this interpretation is not entirely cor-
rect. The basic cause of shortages has been exaggerated predictions of the
growth rate. Although separate estimates of revenue are compiled for each
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category of taxes, these estimates are based largely on the growth rate forecast
in the economic outlook that the government releases at the end of every calen-
dar year when it is almost finished compiling the next fiscal year's budget draft.
Individual income and corporate taxes, which account for a major proportion of
the revenue, are directly influenced by the growth rate. If the actual growth
rate is lower than the forecast rate, the result is a tapering off of revenue during
year.
Observing both Figures 3 and 4 simultaneously, the unrealistically high
growth expectations in 1971, 1975, 1977, 1981-82 and 1991-94 corresponded
with years of a tax shortfall. The important issue here is that the government
has consistently overestimated the growth rate since the mid-1970s except dur-
ing the bubble period of 1987-90. We cannot gloss over this failure of the
EPA's planners to estimate the growth rate accurately at the beginning each
year. In view of the fact that exaggerated estimates of the growth rate are the
prime cause of tax shortages, we must ask why this pattern has been repeated
year after year.
Perhaps at times the forecasting problems have been purely technical in na-
ture or due to unforeseen factors. However, if political motives are also in-
volved, it would mean that past tax shortages were artificiallycreated phenom-
ena to some extent, not unavoidable and unpredictable deficits. For instance,
we could conceive that this was the situation that arose during the process of
compiling the budget for fiscal 1982. This view that exaggerated estimates of
the growth rate by the government were politically motivated was beginning to
gain a wide following. Unrealistic revenue estimates based on an excessively
high growth rate made compilation of the fiscal 1982 budget easier, preserving
a considerable amount of expenditures in areas of lower priority. Overestima-
tion of revenue made it possible to avert demands for drastic expenditure cuts.
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During the Diet debate on the 1982 budget, the opposition parties repeatedly
pointed out that the revenue estimates were too high. Merely by recalling what
happened in the Diet, we can see that revenue estimates for that year were con-
sidered excessive even when the budget was being compiled. Thus the fiscal
1982 revenue shortage was an anticipated result(see,Ishi,1982, P. 10, Hollerman
1988, p. 95). The same phenomena have, more or less, occurred when antici-
pated rates of growth were higher than actual ratesin the past years.
Obviously, the floatationof deficit-coveringbonds is closely linked to tax
shortages. Avoiding tax shortages is one of the means of reducing deficits. It
will be, however, virtuallyimpossible to eliminate shortfallsaltogether because
unenforceable movements in economic conditions occur from time to time. Still,
it should be possible to reduce shortfallsto a considerable extent by breaking
the chain linking the overly high economic growth predictions with unrealistic
estimates of tax revenue.
Lower revenue estimates necessitategreater strictnessin the compilation of
budgets. This strictnessis,in fact,exactly what is needed for fiscalconsolida-
tion. It might even be well advised that forecasts of economic growth be made
to err on the low side and that the tax revenue be estimated conservatively.
Even if the actual economic growth rate were to exceed the prediction,leading
to a revenue surplus like during the 1960s, early 1970s, and the late 1980s, the
extra funds could easily be used to reduce national bond issues.
3.4 Conflict between the Keynesian View and the MOF's View
Before 1973 when the firstoil shock occurred, the government had almost
never needed to employ expansionary fiscalpoliciesin order to stimulate the
Japanese economy. In fact, with a few exceptions, no Keynesian policies were
required reflectingthe buoyancy of aggregate demand, (see,Ackley and Ishi 1976.)
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However, the oil shock caused real income to fall to a great extent not
only in Japan but also in the rest of the world. Most countries fell into a de-
pressed economic state with rampant inflation. The US, W. Germany and Ja-
pan were urged to take expansionary measures in accordance with the new idea
of them being the "three locomotive countries", as described earlier. In 1978,
the Japanese government constructed a very stimulative budget in light of the
large increases in public investment to expand the stagnant economy in the
world. This experience is regarded as the firstintroduction of Keynesian fiscal
policy to Japan.
With a background of prolonged recessions since the oil shock, fiscal ac-
tivism in favor of stimulative measures began to emerge as a powerful device
for attaining full employment. As a consequence, fiscal deficits became a
means of achieving this objective. The same holds for the case of anti-
recessionary policies after the collapse of bubble in the early 1990s. In parallel
with the expansion of the welfare program as stated before, such fiscal activism
clearly played a vital role in increasing the huge amount of fiscal deficits. Faced
with the continued rise of national bond issues, the economists' views were di-
vided into two groups, one being Keynesian, and the other anti-Keynesian.
The Keynesian group is generally composed of specialists majoring in
macroeconomics, or the staff at MITI, the MOC or the EPA. The Keynesians
usually push the government to take on an expansionary budget, say, in the
form of tax cuts and increases in public investment. Their target for achieving
the rates of real growth is always higher than the government's officially antici-
pated figure, mainly because they believe that the potential path of Japan's eco-
nomic growth must be higher. As a consequence, the Keynesian groups ignore
too often the accumulative effects of a chain of fiscal deficits. They feel opti-
mistic about debt accumulation, which would be naturally reduced by the gen-
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eration of tax revenues in a growing economy. According to the Keynesian
view in Japan, it is more important to achieve a higher rate of growth than to
eliminate fiscal deficits.
On the other hand, a view contrary to the Keynesian view is strongly sup-
ported by public finance specialists or the MOF staff. They compose the anti-
Keynesian group. Generally speaking, a traditional embarrassment of fiscal
deficits and growing public debts seems to be quite common to this group.
They place more emphasis on the traditional principles of sound finance―that is,
no deficit is justified if associated with unproductive investments, or current ex-
penditures, or if permanent differences between expenditure and revenues result.
In the view of the anti-Keynesian group, a fiscal deficit may be beneficial with
respect to this year's economic performance especially when the economy is
working at less than full capacity, but it may be harmful with reference to fu-
ture economic performance if it leads to excessive increases in public debt.
Thus, they are usually worried about debt accumulation, and emphasize the ne-
cessity of reducing it.
These two views, which are quite different regarding debt accumulation,
have conflicted with each over the past decades. Relatively speaking, I myself
support the anti-Keynesian position, although I admit the necessity of stimulat-
ing the economy by issuing national bonds in a severe depression. It seems to
me that the present fiscal deficits are growing beyond acceptable cyclical defi-
cits.If deficits were mostly cyclical, they would grow during recessions and
swing into surpluses during recoveries. This being the case, the public debt
would not accumulate over time. The present situation seems to be different; to-
day's deficits are not cyclical but structural. Structural deficits would remain
"high" even if full employment is achieved.
Also, the interest rate on national bonds has exceeded the nominal growth
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rate of GDP for the past several years. For example, the latter is estimated to
be 3.50 percent for 1996-2000 by the new economic plan of the EPA,3) while
the former has been fixed at about 5 percent in recent years in order that the
bonds they sell well in the market. In accordance with the famous Domar
model (see Domar 1944), from a theoretical consideration, the ratio of interest
payments to nominal GNP will not converge if the present rates of economic
growth or interest rates continue. This being the case, it may be argued that a
large debt at present would eventually bankrupt the government.
4. Strategies for Deficit Reduction
4.1 Why is Deficit Reduction Necessary?
It is often argued that fiscal deficits need to be curtailed when accumulated,
not only because of their harmful effect on the economic performance of a na-
tion, but also because of the burden on the budget and future generations
caused by interest payments on the public debt (see, for instance, OECD 1995).
Theoretically speaking, there are three negative effects on the marco side
of the economy derived from the expansion of fiscal deficits.
1. Inflation
2. Crowding-out effect in the fund markets
3. Currency depreciation
These damages have in practice occurred during the past economic per-
formance of major countries, such as the US, the UK, France, German, etc. For
instance, Germany has been constantly concerned with potential inflation caused
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by accumulated debt in the past. France is suffering from a high rate of interest
and crowding out in the fund markets after fiscal deficits have expanded rapidly.
Moreover, all European countries are embarrassed about their currency depre-
ciation due to a weakening of their credibility resulting from expanded debt.
That is the reason why each country has been worried about the current debt
accumulation and has embarked on its own deficit reduction, as argued earlier.4'
By contrast, in contemporary Japan, fiscal deficits are not likely to induce
possible harmful effects on the economy as a whole. In particular, it has gener-
ally been argued that Japan is stillmaintaining the highest rate of saving among
major countries. This argument would perhaps have been supported in the
1970s and 1980s. For instance, in terms of the personal saving rate in 1983,
Japan had 17.3% while W. Germany had 11.4%, France 11.5%, the US 5.0%,
and the UK 7.0%. The extent to which fiscal deficits crowd out private invest-
ment depend on the rate of personal saving of the country. A country like Ja-
pan with a high rate of personal saving that exceeds its domestic investment op-
portunities can easily finance its own investment as well as its fiscal deficit.
This is to be contrasted with the US experience in which an increasing share of
savings has been appropriated to fiscal deficits because of a very low saving
rate.
However, Japan's advantage has begun to disappear in recent years. In fact,
the personal saving rates in Japan, the UK, France and Germany excluding the
US, ranged between a band of 13-15 percent in 1992. (See, Tachi eds. 1995, p.
304.) It is difficult to find evidence of Japan's superior position in terms of its
personal saving rate in recent years. Furthermore, it is pointed out that Japan's
saving rate will begin to diminish to a considerable extent from around 2005
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when the baby-boomer begin to retire from their jobs (See, for example, Group
of Ten.)5'
In addition, the sharp rise in debt redemption and interest payments caused
by an accumulating debt poses serious problems to the performance of govern-
ment fiscal activity. As observed in Table 2, large increases in national bond
floatings have made national debt service and interest payments by far the fast-
est growing component of public expenditures. This was true at least until the
burst of the bubble. If we examine the movement of interest payments as a
percentage of public expenditures in the general account, we note that it has
rapidly increased since the balanced budget principle had to be abandoned. In
1971, for example, interest payments were 2.2 percent of public expenditures,
while by 1987 this payment increased over 7.5 fold, reaching 20.2 percent.
Thereafter, this ratio has begun to slow down to 16.4 percent in 1995, reflecting
both the effects of deficit reduction during the bubble period and the lower rates
of interest. However, it will turn upward again, and will grow swiftly, given the
continued accumulation of fiscal deficits in the future. The same holds for the
long-run trend of national debt services, which has sharply expanded from 3.4
percent in 1971 to 21.8 per cent in 1996. This growth will swell public expen-
ditures, increasing the relative portion of entitlements in the total, which will es-
sentially make budgeting more rigid every year. In Japan, such rigidity in the
budget is considered as a serious problems related to expanded deficits. No
doubt, fiscal deficits are feeding upon themselves through the interest compo-
nent of public expenditures, making their curtailment more difficult.
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Table 2 National Debt Charges and InterestPayments
Apart from such in-budget difficulties,the expanded deficitstend to gener-
ate another issue, that of intergenerationalinequity via future the tax burden
arising from redemption and interest payments. Although controversial argu-
ments have been repeated regarding the shiftingof the public debt burden to fu-
ture generations,it would not be unreasonable to conjecture that future genera-
tions should certainly bear the burden of public debt through possible tax in-
creases (see,forexample, Buchanan 1958, Wiseman 1984).
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In recent years, special attention has been paid to the generational account-
ing approach to answer how much future generations will have to pay in net
burdens (i.e.,tax and social security contributions) as compared to today's genera-
tion (see, Kotlikoff, 1992). The concept of generational accounting originally
emerged as an alternative measure of the deficit, espousing that the current defi-
cit measurement should be discarded and replaced by this new concept. Alter-
natively, generational accounting would be of great use in calculating the inter-
generational burdens implied by the current tax and spending policies. Thus,
relevant calculations have begun to appear in relation to a number of countries,
such as Sweden (see, for instance, R. P. Hhagemann and C. John, 1995).
In Japan, the EPA calculates the result of generational accounts, as seen in
Tahle 3 The Results of Generational Accounting in Tanan
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Table 3, broadening the coverage of estimation to include not only future but
also past burden-benefit relations. There are a couple of interesting point worth
noting. First, the size of the net burden varies with age, with the older genera-
tion over the ages of 50 and 60 enjoying a net benefit, rather than a net burden.
On the other hand, the younger generation under the age of 40 must pay more
taxes and social security contributions than they receive in public services over
a lifetime to a great extent.
Second, the net burden on future generations would be the largest among
all age groups, with future generations paying an additional ＼13,408 thousand
as compared with that of the youngest current generation of age 20. This result
is important in our context, because the accumulated debt is assumed to be
borne by future generations. No doubt, it is conjectured that the public debt
burden could be shifted to future generations in Japan, given the current budget-
ary system.
Given both the macro and micro effects, currently and in the future, of ac-
cumulated debt, it is very clear that the Japanese government should launch into
a reduction of fiscal deficits and restrain the rise of the outstanding debt relative
to general economic activity in the nation.
4.2 Strategy for Fiscal Consolidation
Since the public debts have begun to accumulate to some extent, greater
importance has been placed on the establishment of specific targets for deficit
reduction every year or at least within certain periods in major countries. For
instance in the US, the federal government has recently enacted the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) in 1990 and in 1993 for expenditure cuts in
which the so-called "caps" (upper ceilings) were put to restrain deliberate (non-
entitlement) expenditures within a fixed limit (i.e.,average growth rates of 0.1 per
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cent in real terms). Furthermore, an attempt for restoring the budget balance by
2002 has been established in fiscal 1995 by the Presidential Budget Statement
and Budget Resolution, although strategies for expenditure cuts are different
among the Democrats and the Republicans. As a consequence, government
shutdowns were incurred twice in 1995. In addition to setting forth caps on de-
liberate expenditures, the pay-as-you-go rule6' was permanently introduced to
maintain a fixed level of entitlement expenditures for recovering the balance of
the federal budget.
Likewise, the UK government has attempted to restrain the real growth
rate of general government expenditures to less than 1.5 percent every year un-
der the control total scheme which has been executed from 1993. In Germany,
the ratio of general government expenditures to GDP is targeted for reduction to
46 percent (i.e.,Germany's pre-unificationlevel) by the year 2000 with a simultane-
ous reduction of 1 percent in the deficit-GDP ratio. In addition, the tax burden
relative to GDP ought to be lowered to 23.5 percent by the year 2000. These
targets are included in the Mid-term Fiscal Strategy of the Federal Ministry of
Finance. The French government also constructed targets for reducing the defi-
cit ratio by 1 percent each year by fiscal 1997 in order to satisfy the 3 percent
target in the Maastricht criterion.
Similar to the strategies for deficit reduction in other major countries, the
Japanese government established a target for fiscal consolidation; zero depend-
ency on deficit-covering bonds by a specific year. The first target was set to
eliminate deficit-covering bonds as a source of financial revenue by the end of
fiscal 1980, reflecting the rapid expansion of fiscal deficits in the late 1970s.
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However, the government failed to achieve itsinitialtarget for fiscalconsolida-
tion,given the state of over-expanded fiscaldeficits. Thus, the government had
to continue its effortsfor expenditure cuts towards the second goal of fiscal
1984.
The second target was also unable to succeed in avoiding the issuance of
deficit-covering bonds within the period, mainly because a massive revenue
shortage emerged from the world recession after the second oil shock. Once
again the government was forced to set a third target to restore the budget bal-
ance by fiscal1990. The new goal was fortunately achieved in fiscal1990 by
employing a windfall increase of tax revenues due to the bubble boom, as will
be argued in detailshortly.
In the process of fiscalconsolidation, a guideline for budget requests was
adopted from the second half of the 1970s. The guideline for expenditure cuts
is the "ceiling" strategy.In the course of preparing the budget, usually at the
end of August of the previous year, the MOF sets a maximum ceiling for the
budget requests of all ministriesand agencies for the next fiscalyear. Table 4
summarizes the guidelines in the 1980s when the ceiling strategy began to be
applied strictlyto government expenditures. A "zero ceiling" means that
budget requests are to be frozen at the level of budget appropriations for the
previous fiscal,and a "negative" ceiling means that the request must stay below
the preceding year's budget allocations.During the period of rapid economic
growth in the 1960s, even 30-50% increases were sometimes allowed for
budget requests as a whole, in sharp contrastto the situationin the 1980s.
With the full-fledgedintroduction of the ceiling strategy,some categories
of government expenditures have been held to the levels of the previous budget
from fiscal 1978, and furthermore no increase has been allowed for any non-
entitlement spending categories since the fiscal1982 budget under the zero ceil-
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Table 4 The Guideline of Ceilings for Budget Requests
ing. Finally, the negative ceiling was adopted in the fiscal 1983 and 1984
budgets. The 1985-91 budgets were drawn up under the negative ceiling strat-
egy with some exceptional cases forinvestment expenditures.
While the zero and negative ceilings were introduced into current and in-
vestment expenditures, an ad hoc allotment scheme has been applied to specific
areas of expenditure on items on which are generally considered to be of more
importance, separate from other expenditures. For example, certainlump-sum
funds were allocated to the expenditure for enhancing the quality of lifein 1991
-93 and for the promotion of public investment in 1992-96. As noted below,
similar financial resources under the NTT scheme have been given to certain
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public work projects on an ad hoc basis since 1988.
Since the ceiling strategy was introduced in the budgetary process, the
government has succeeded in keeping the budget from growing, despite strong
requests for budget increases from political interest groups, many ministries and
agencies.
As Figure 5 depicts, the rise in non-entitlement government expenditures,
which exceeded 20% per annum in some years during the rapid growth period,
has slowed to less than 10% per year since fiscal 1981. Of the various expen-
diture categories, national debt services and tax-share grants to local govern-
ments are "entitled" or not subject to expenditure cuts. Thus, the targets of the
MOF's proposed expentiture cuts are other "non-entitlement" government ex-
penditures. Indeed, these expenditures have shown virtually zero growth in the
late 1980s, and thereafter their growth rates have been restrained to one-digit in-
creases. However, a substantial rise in such expenditures have begun once again,
reflecting the adoption of fiscal expansion in the early 1990s.
Figure 4 may be misleading. It is drawn using conventional non-
entitlement government expenditures within the scope of the general account,
but in the 1980s fiscal "window-dressing" became prevalent on the expenditure
side of the budget. To restrain the growth rate of non-entitlement expenditures
to zero, fiscal "window-dressing" on the expenditure side became more signifi-
cant every year. It takes the form of excluding various categories of expendi-
ture from the general account budget which should correctly be assigned there.
For instance, a portion of the transfers to the social insurance accounts has been
postponed, not appropriated. This represents borrowing which should be in-
cluded in the expenditure side of the current fiscal year. In general, the MOF
was successful in making the true expenditure position obscure and fostering
the impression of adherence to "fiscal consolidation with expenditure cuts" to
－263(108)－
－262(109)－
the public.
4.3 The Rincho and Administrative Reform
Since the deficitsin Japan are largely structural,they have to be reduced
through basic changes in the level and pattern of public expenditures and in the
tax system. In this case, it seems that a Keynesian type of policy cannot be of
any help in reducing fiscaldeficits. Keynesian policies are merely temporary,
stop-gap measures. Of course, stop-gap measures help in reducing debt accumu-
lation,but they do not bring permanent solutionto the fiscalunbalance. Perma-
nent solutions require permanent measures. Structuralreforms become neces-
sary when debt accumulation resultsfrom structuraldeficits.
Keynesian policiesmay be able to bring about a short-run reduction in the
public debt through the natural increase of taxes generated by a higher rate of
growth. However, they will not cure the disease of debt accumulation. Further-
more, we must note that the economic realitiessince the oil shocks dictate that
there would be no more continued high-speed expansion of business conditions.
Given the future performance of the economy, tax revenues on a large enough
scale to reduce automatically the accumulation of public debt could not be ex-
pected. The scenario drawn by the Keynesians is not likely to be realized.
Since the emergence of the public debt explosion in the late 1970s, the
much needed reductions in Japan's huge fiscaldeficitshave progressed only at
a snail'space in the early 1980s because politicalconsiderations and other fac-
tors prevented the government from implementing either full-fledged tax in-
creases or expenditure cuts. The fiscaldeficitsafflictingJapan and many of the
advanced countries were caused by structuraland not cyclicalfactors.
Structural fiscal deficitscan be eliminated only by sweeping reforms in
both the expenditure and revenue structures.On this point, the new strategy of
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"administrative reform" which the government adopted in 1981 can be evalu-
ated highly as the proper policy choice in Japan. At first, the government in-
tended to contain the size of the fiscal deficits by tax increases, rather than ex-
penditure cuts. In fact, the introduction of a new value-added tax (VAT), called
the general consumption tax, was attempted by then Prime Minister Ohira in
1979, but it was a complete failure. As a result, it became politically very diffi-
cult to introduce enough tax increases to reduce the public debt, and the gov-
ernment had to change its policy stance from a reliance on tax increases to ex-
penditure cuts (see, Lincoln 1988, Chapter 3, Ishi 1993, Chapter 15).
In particular, the Ad Hoc Committee for Administrative Reform (The Rinji
Gyosei Kaikaku Chosakai―or Rincho in short), established in 1981, had been play-
ing an important role, backed by nation-wide support, in preventing the govern-
ment from growing further. The Rincho recommended expenditure cuts and re-
viewed the activities and functions of government-affiliated institutions under
the slogan of "fiscal consolidation without tax increases". As argued earlier, in
accordance with the Rincho activities, the government set a maximum ceiling
on the increase in public expenditures relative to the previous year for the com-
pilation of the new budget every fiscal year. No doubt, this "ceiling" method
was supported and intensified by the Rincho.
The main aim of the Rincho was to promote administrative reform in order
to solve Japan's fiscal crisis, which was at the core of the Rincho's concerns.
The Rincho embraced two other goals, that of reconstructuring the fiscal struc-
ture and reducing the size of the gevernment, as expounded in yet another slo-
gan, "small government." When Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki established the
Rincho in March 1981, he declared that he would stake his political life on the
achievement of administrative reform, in particular pledging that he would re-
store a balanced budget by fiscal 1984. However, as previously mentioned, he
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decided to resign as prime ministerin July 1982, mainly due to his failurein at-
taining fiscalconsolidation by the deadline under consideration.
Administrative reform was widely approved by the general public, but in-
side the government it was true that both the bureaucrats and the politiciansdid
not really want administrative reform and tried to avoid any significantreform
in substance. Strong resistance against such new reforms was persistently
shown to the Rincho members. Needless to say, the Rincho proposed various
fundamental reforms which threatened to curtail certain ministerial privileges,
and also to shiftthe relativedistributionof ministerialpower. In turn, politi-
cians and vested-interestgroups related to the relevant ministries and agencies
were also threatened by the Rincho movement. They became allieswhen pres-
sure had to be placed on the government to maintain theirindividual interests,
although it was difficultto protest overtly against administrative reform. In
other words, the typicaltacticwas "to convey gestures of agreement in principle,
but to disagree with the particulars"(soron-sansei,kakuron-hantai).
Despite such struggles among the individuals concerned, administrative re-
form played a vitalrole in restrictingthe rise of government expenditures since
its debut. In total,the level of non-entitlement government expenditures began
to show a sharply decreasing tempo, as seen in Figure 6.4.In fact,the govern-
ment's effortto restrictexpenditures by imposing a strictceilingstrategy toward
the ultimate goal of "fiscalconsolidation without tax increases" performed well
in achieving its initialobjective. All ministries and agencies slashed their
budget requests to the minimum tolerablelevel. The government was compelled
to reviselaws and institutionalsystems to reduce expenditure. For example, two
fiscalreforms were important. First,in fiscal1984, the national healthinsurance
system was revised to cut medical expenses to a certainextent.Second, in fiscal
1985, some of the national government grant-in-aidsto local governments were
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scaled back. Both measures represented drastic fiscalreforms by traditional
Japanese standards, and they seem to have been feasibleonly under the ceiling
and the prevailing mood of administrative reform.
Although it sounds like an innocuous name, apart from the mere adminis-
trativeformalities,administrative reform contained a broader scope for political
and economic reforms as well. The most noteworthy accomplishments of the
process of administrative reform evidently were to move in the direction of pri-
vatizing the three public corporations on the basis of recommendations pre-
sented by the Rincho in 1982. In April 1985, both the Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone Public Corporation, and the Japan Tabacco and Salt Public Corpora-
tion were simultaneously privatized to become the privately incorporated com-
panies of NTT and JT (Japan Tobacco Inc). Furthermore, in April 1987, the
Japanese National Railroad (JNR) was also reorganized and splitinto seven re-
gional companies for passenger transportation(JR).
In view of fiscalconsolidation, great importance was attached to the JNR
reform which was the Rincho's chief priority. The JNR had continued to accu-
mulate deficitssince 1970, which had to be compensated by tax revenues from
the national budget. The accumulated deficitwas largely attributedto labour
struggles,inefficientmanagement, unprofitablelocal lines and so on. Thus, the
privatizationof JNR into JR greatly contributed to restoring the budgetary bal-
ance (see,foran expanded discussion,Hollermman 1988, ch.4).
4.4 NTT Scheme and Public Investment
When the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation was privat-
ized into NTT in April 1985, two-thirds of its stock could be sold in the market,
with revenues to be appropriated for the redemption of national bonds issued by
the government in the past. At the outset they were reverted into the Special
－258(113)－
Account for the National Debt Consolidation Fund, and then a substantial
amount of funds began to accumulate in this special account through the fa-
vourable sale of NTT stock in the market from fiscal1986 to fiscal1988.7)To-
talrevenues of about ＼10,000 billion were generated from the stock sales dur-
ing these years.
Thus, a new scheme named the NTT programme was established by using
the accumulated funds to promote the enhancement of socialinfrastructurein
the fiscal1988 budget. This was a device established to improve the level of
socialinfrastructurein the midst of fallingfinancial sources for public invest-
ment due to the ongoing process of fiscalconsolidation. The revenues from the
sale of NTT stock were appropriated for making interest-freeloans, despite the
fact that they were legally required to be employed for the redemption of na-
tional bonds. No doubt, the maturing loans need to be repaid to the Special
Account described above, and the loans made were strictlyrestrictedto safe op-
portunities.
The NTT scheme was composed of the following three types of loans A, B
and C.
･ Type A Interest-freeloans to the construction of public facilitiesyield-
ing profits for repayment within 20 years. A typical example is highway
construction on the basis of self-liquidationby the Japan Highway Public
Corporation. In a word, thisis a type of profitablepublic works.
･ Type B Loans were made to stimulatelocal governments to implement
public works. However, these public works are not expected to produce
any profits for repayment, and so the national government provides the
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subsidies necessary to repay the loans on maturity. This type of loan has to
be repaid within 20 years. This is a kind of ordinary public works expen-
diture.
･ Type C The loans made to the third sector had to be capitalized partly
by local governments and/or other public corporations, such as the Japan
Development Bank. The basic aim was to apply the projects to revitalize
the private sector. This type of loans must be repaid within 15 years.
An outline of the NTT scheme is roughly delineated in Figure 6. A portion
of the revenues from the sale of NTT stock which are deposited in the Special
Account for the National Debt Fund, became interest-free loans that were
picked up and transferred to the general account. Moreover, the funds for such
a loan are transferred to the Industrial Investment Special Account (included in-
side the Social Infrastructure Account) in order to be administered on a consolidated
basis. The NTT scheme provides interest-free loans of types A, B and C either
directly or indirectly (i.e.,via public works related special accounts or the Japan Devel-
opment Bank, etc.)from the Industrial Investment Special Account.
Figure 6 The NTT Scheme
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